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Abstract: 
The determinants of corporate indebtedness have been one of the most debated issues in 
empirical corporate finance research. In the Indian context, a number of research papers 
focusing on the said issue emerged since the 1990s. These research studies classified 
borrowing (the explained variable) based on the time perspective, namely, long-term and 
short-term. While this temporal categorization of borrowed capital remains important in 
analyzing capital structure choice, an alternative categorization based on whether 
borrowing is collateralized (secured) or not, has remained off focus. Consequently, the 
role of secured debt in addressing agency issues and problems of asymmetric information 
has remained largely unexplored. This exploratory research paper aims at addressing this 
issue, using a sample of manufacturing firms listed in the BSE 500 and SNP CNX 500 
index. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The determinants of corporate indebtedness have been one of the most debated issues in 
empirical corporate finance research. In the Indian context, a number of research papers 
focusing on the said issue emerged since the 1990s, (see Kakani 1999, Bhaduri 2002, 
2002a, Guha-Khasnobis and Bhaduri 2002, Mahakud and Bhole 2003, Bhole and 
Mahakud 2004, Mahakud 2006). These research studies classified borrowing (the 
explained/dependent variable) based on the time perspective, namely, long-term and 
short-term. While the temporal categorization of borrowed capital remains important in 
analyzing capital structure choice, an alternative categorization based on whether 
borrowing is collateralized (secured) or not, has remained off focus. Consequently, the 
role of secured debt in addressing agency issues and problems of asymmetric information 
has remained largely unexplored; we do not know whether and to what extent borrowers 
use collateral to signal project quality, or whether observably risky borrowers pledge 
more collateral to secure financing. We are also not aware of whether secured debt 
market discriminates firms in terms of its size.  
In attempting to fill up this gap in existing literature, this paper is expected to contribute 
to our understanding of the role of secured debt market as an institution for corporate 
financing in India and its stage of development, and also provide critical inputs necessary 
for initiating reforms in this segment of the market so as to further its role as an 
intermediary institution.  
The paper is organized as follows; the next section focuses on the available literature on 
secured borrowing and identifies the probable influencers of secured borrowing. This is 
followed by a description of the methodology adopted in the paper, including sample 
selection, data source, variable definition and statistical model. We present the findings 
of the research in the next section along with their interpretation. The last section 
identifies the limitations of the paper, before concluding.  
A Review of Available Evidence 
Harris and Raviv (1991) identified four categories of determinants of capital structure. In 
their words, ‘these are the desire to  
• ameliorate conflicts of interest among various groups with claims to the firm’s 
resources, including managers (the agency approach), 
• convey private information to capital markets or mitigate adverse selection effects 
(the asymmetric information approach), 
• influence the nature of products or competition in the product/input market, or 
• affect the outcome of corporate control contests.’  
From the relevance perspective, this paper focuses upon the first two categories of 
determinants addressing the agency and asymmetric information issues. We discuss each 
of these approaches and the role of secured debt in this regard. 
Existing literature on agency issues categorize conflicts of interests among a firm’s 
claimants in two broad categories. First, is the conflict between shareholders and 
managers and, second, between shareholders and lenders. The former arises primarily 
from the asymmetry of efforts and rewards that exists between the principal 
(shareholders) and managers (as agents of the principal), while the later arises because of 
the asymmetry of claims that shareholders and lenders have on the outcome of an 
investment. In the later case, if an investment produces large returns, shareholders 
capture most of the gains; in failure limited liability of equity shareholders ensures that 
debt holders bear the loss. Consequently, shareholders stand a chance to benefit from a 
risky project that the firm undertakes, even if it is value decreasing. Such investments 
reduce the value of debt (a rise in perceived risk diminishes value), while for equity, their 
loss in value as a consequence of poor investment can be more than offset by the gain in 
value captured at the expense of debt holders.  
One possible way lenders may insure against risk shifting practice is through bond 
indentures. Alternatively, they may seek collateral as security against which finances are 
raised. Collateralized or secured debt refers to debt backed by a specific charge created 
on the fixed assets of the issuer company, ensuring that in bankruptcy these assets can be 
sold to repay the investors; the purchaser essentially transfers financial risk to the seller 
of the instrument, and given the security of a collateral and preferential treatment with 
regard to repayment in case of liquidation, cost of secured debt is lower. Secured debt 
however has its own costs as observed in Stulz and Johnson (1985) and Igawa and Kantas 
(1990). The former identified that pledging an asset as collateral against loan, led to a 
loss of flexibility on the part of the company with regard to use and liquidity of the asset, 
while the later discussed how collateralized borrowing resulted in moral hazard involving 
the borrower’s use of pledged assets, in so far as maintaining its value is concerned. 
While we do not know whether the benefits of secured debt outweigh the costs, or 
otherwise in the Indian context, available empirical evidence on the positive relationship 
between tangibility of assets and long-term borrowing, allows us to incorporate this 
factor as an independent variable in our analysis; a necessary, if not sufficient condition 
for access and use of secured debt. This off course presupposes a certain stage of 
development in the market for collateralized borrowing. 
The asymmetric information based explanation of capital structure choice is based on the 
assumption that the insiders of a firm have access to information that outsiders do not 
have. In these sets of models the choice of capital structure addresses the problems of 
over- and under-investment (Myers and Majluf, 1984), while its dynamics (changing 
debt-equity ratio) conveys private information to the outsiders (Ross, 1977). Myers 
(1977) asserts that the problems of asymmetric information in general and over/under-
investment in particular are most critical for firms whose value consists primarily of 
intangible investment opportunities or growth options and consequently, growing firms 
tend to shy away from debt. Secured debt in the context of growing firms can be a 
potential solution to this problem.  To the extent the financial markets view borrowers 
use of collateral as a credible signal of project quality (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kantas, 
1985), pledging a collateral enables these firms to raise finance, and since assets pledged 
as collateral cannot be disposed of easily, secured debt lowers total costs of borrowing by 
limiting asset substitution opportunities. This lower cost of collateralized borrowing also 
enables the firm to undertake projects that it would have otherwise foregone if normal 
(unsecured) debt were the lone financing possibility. Consequently one would expect a 
direct relationship between firm growth opportunities and the use of secured debt in 
financing.  
Another potential determinant of secured debt ratio relate to the possibility of bankruptcy 
of a firm. Theoretically firms with lower possibility of bankruptcy are better equipped to 
issue secured debt compared to other firms and hence an inverse relation between 
possibility of bankruptcy and secured debt issue may be hypothesized. This has been 
observed in Bester (1985), and Chan and Kantas (1985). Recent literature on the said 
issue however provides evidence contrary to the above findings; Leeth and Scott (1989) 
observed that that the probability of using secured loan is directly related to the likelihood 
of default, and Inderst and Muller (2007) observed that while borrowers who could 
pledge more collateral were more likely to obtain credit, observably risky borrowers 
faced higher collateral requirements. The study also observed that after controlling for 
observable borrowers risk, collateralized loans were more likely to default ex post.  Given 
these contradictory findings, it appears that the verdict on firm risk and secured debt ratio 
is still at large.   
Does firm size and age influence secured debt ratio? We do not know. While available 
empirical evidence in Kale, Neo and Ramirez (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Bevan and Danbolt (2004), point towards a positive association between firm size and 
indebtedness, and Majumdar (2010) observed a positive association between debt 
maturity and size, we do not know whether larger sized firms employ a higher proportion 
of secured or whether they leverage their lower probability of default (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995) to employ more unsecured debt.  
Diamond (1989) observed that a firm’s reputation has an important influence in 
mitigating conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. While reputation in the 
product market stems from product, market and technological knowledge, in the input 
market it emanates from relationships with suppliers of raw materials and the firm’s own 
credit history (in terms of debt repayment and servicing). A firm that is low in reputation 
has incentives in selecting excessively risky projects to benefit shareholders at the 
expense of lenders. A reputed firm on the other hand would refrain from such risk 
shifting behavior, given that it might endanger an intangible asset that has taken years to 
build. While it is difficult to measure an intangible, like reputation, the number of years a 
firm is in business appears to be a close proxy for the same. Does firm age favorably 
affect information asymmetry and reduce the incidence of secured debt? Or does young 
firms take recourse to secured debt, given the absence of the reputation asset for them in 
the market?  
This exploratory study analyzes the impact of these independent variables, namely, 
tangibility, growth opportunities, firm risk, firm size and age of the firm on the 
proportion of secured debt employed in its capital structure. The exact definitions of the 
variables mentioned above are detailed in Appendix I.  
Methodology  
The population for our empirical study include the universe of manufacturing firms in 
India. From this population we focus on those manufacturing firms listed in the BSE 500 
and S&P CNX 500 index. These two indices (with considerable overlaps in their 
constitution) are the largest professionally managed indices of listed stocks in the country 
and consists of large cap, mid cap and small cap stocks that make it a more representative 
sample compared to any other smaller indices. From this sample, we select companies for 
which financial information on all the variables used in this research are available over 
the period 2004-05 to 2008-09, and cash flow statistics are available for the period 2000-
01 to 2008-09. Consequently the sample size stood at 194 resulting in 970 observations. 
The financial data necessary for the research is obtained from the database PROWESS of 
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy.  
This paper employs panel data regression model as a statistical tool for analysis. Panel or 
longitudinal data refers to data containing time series observations of a number of 
individual units. Observations in panel data involve at least two dimensions; a cross 
sectional dimension and a time series dimension. For instance, secured debt ratio of a 
firm i in a sample of j firms represent the cross sectional dimension, while the same ratio 
over time for the same firm, denoted by t, represent the time series dimension. More than 
two dimensions represent more complicated clustering or hierarchical structures. 
Extending the above illustration, two more dimensions may be added by including a 
country and a sector dimension. The key feature of panel data that distinguishes it from 
pooled cross section is that the same cross sectional units are followed over a given 
period of time. 
Ever since Balestra and Nerlove (1966) paper on pooling cross-section and time series 
data was published, there has been phenomenal progress in applied studies and 
methodological development of new econometric tools of panel data. A primary reason 
behind the increasing popularity of panel data models stems from its greater capacity of 
modeling complex behavior compared to single cross-sectional or time series data alone. 
Baltagi B H and Griffin J M (1988), Wooldridge (1999), Baltagi (2008), Hsiao and 
Yanun (2006), discusses the reasons behind the growing popularity of this data structure. 
In particular, panel data models provide major benefits for econometric estimation in 
controlling for individual heterogeneity, eliminating or reducing estimation bias and 
reducing the problems of data multicollinearity. These advantages of panel data provide 
the basic motivation behind the choice of this regression model. 
The regression equations we test take the following form: 
(Secured Debt Ratio)
 i,t =  αi,t + β1(Tangibility)i,t + β2(Growth) i,t + β 3(Risk) i,t + β 4(Size) i,t 
+ β5(Age) i,t + ξi,t ……………………..(i)   
where subscript i denotes the ith firm, and t refers to time (here year of observation) and β
 
denotes the unknown parameters of interest. Before testing the above mentioned 
hypothesis using the above panel data, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test and Hausman specification tests are carried out for the sample of 
firms to know the significance of firm and time effects in the data set, and to find out a 
suitable panel data method for the estimation of the model. For the estimation equation, 
the overall F-Statistic and its statistical significance, along with R-squared value is used 
to judge its relevance and sufficiency. The statistical significance and the sign of 
coefficients associated with each of the independent variables are used to draw inferences 
about the factors affecting secured debt ratio. 
 
Findings and Analysis 
The summary statistics of the independent variables are presented in Table 1, depicting 
heterogeneity of the sample and hence its representative nature. Table 2 shows the  
Table 1: Summary Statistic of Independent and Dependent Variables (Sample size 970) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Secured debt ratio 0.1729       0.1536 
Tangibility 0.3519     0.1881 
Growth  2.1843 1.5558 
Risk 0.4772 0.5130 
Size 7.4892 1.2879 
Age 3.4639 0.6882 
 
correlations between the variables selected in the model. Note that secured debt ratio is 
positively correlated to tangibility and inversely correlated to firm growth opportunities. 
Another variable that exhibit strong inverse correlation appears to be firm age, implying 
that higher the age of the firm lower is the secured debt ratio. The correlation between 
risk and secured debt ratio is positive but small. Table 2 also shows correlations between 
the independent variables considered in the model are sufficiently small to create 
problems of multicollinearity.  
Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
 
SD_TA Tangibility Growth  Risk Size Age 
Tangibility 0.46 1     
Growth  -0.36 -0.26 1    
Risk 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 1   
Size -0.16 0.08 -0.06 -0.05 1  
Age -0.34 -0.10 0.10 -0.13 0.21 1 
 
Table 3 shows that the null hypothesis H01: σµ2 = 0 and H02; σµ2 = σλ2= 0 are rejected. 
Clearly, the LR test result shows that both the firm and time effects are present in the 
data. Lagrange Multiplier test statistics presented in the tables indicate that either the 
fixed effect or random effect panel data models are to be preferred to the classical linear 
regression model. The statistically significant Hausman specification test results favour 
the use of fixed effects model over the random effects model. Consequently Table 4 
present the regression results of both the fixed effects firm and fixed effects firm and time 
models, respectively. 
  
Table 3: Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test and Hausman Test 
Results for the period 2004-2005 to 2008-2009 for Secured Borrowing 
Tests  Test Statistics P-Values Test Statistics P-Values 
LR Test χ2(193) = 1439.32 0.000 χ2(198) = 1446.47  0.000 
LM Test χ2(1) = 928.11 0.000 χ2(2) = 928.35 0.000 
Hausman Test χ2(5) = 25.53 0.000 χ2(5) = 29.43 0.000 
Regression results from Table 4 show tangibility, growth opportunities and firm size as 
statistically significant variables affecting secured debt ratio in both the models. The F-
statistic validates the statistical significance of the regression equation. The explanatory 
powers of the models are given by the r-squared values.  
Table 4: Results of Regression – Secured Borrowings 
Variables    Model 1       Model 2    
Note –  
(i) Model 1 refers to the Fixed Effect Firm Model and Model 2 refers to the 
Fixed Effect Firm and Time Model 
(ii) The fixed effect model does not have an intercept term 
(iii) The figures in parenthesis alongside the coefficients show the standard errors 
(iv) *, **, *** Represent the 1%, 5% and 10 % level of significance respectively 
 
As can be seen secured debt ratio vary directly with the tangibility of a firm’s assets (in 
both the fixed effect firm and fixed effect firm and time model), implying that the 
incidence of secured borrowing increases with the firm’s capacity to pledge collateral.  
While we are not in a position to comment on the rate of growth of secured debt vis-à-vis 
incremental rise in tangibility, our evidence suggests that the benefits of using secured 
debt outweighs its costs, and hence the positive relation.  
Findings with regard to growth indicate an inverse relation between growth opportunities 
and secured debt ratio in case of both the models. While this may be contrary to our 
Constant -------- 0.1032(0.1399) 
Tangibility 0.2072(0.0357)* 0.1941(0.0361)* 
Growth Prospect -0.0069(0.0024)* -0.0072(0.0028)** 
Risk -0.0005(0.0005) -0.0004(0.0055) 
Size -0.0252(0.01076)* -0.0142(0.0092)** 
Age -0.0036(0.0343) 0.0036(0.0392) 
N 970 970 
Adjusted R2 0.8241 0.8243 
F-Test Result 23.94* 23.39* 
expectations, there may be multiple rationales behind this observation. Given an inverse 
relation between growth opportunities and indebtedness (in the Indian context) 
(Majumdar, 2010), an inverse relation between the former and secured debt ratio may be 
interpreted as a general tendency of growth firms to avoid debt markets. Second, 
financing deficit in the face of asymmetric information, limited collateralizable capacity 
and transaction costs (involved in debt issue) may compel these firms to take recourse to 
unsecured borrowings from banks and other financial institutions. Third, the observations 
of Bester (1985) and Chan and Kantas (1985) on collateral as a credible signal for project 
quality may not be a valid proposition in the Indian context, that is, growth firms may not 
be in a position to garner financing even against collateral. This may be an outcome of 
the under-developed nature of the secured debt market (and the legal and administrative 
complications involved in compensating the lender in the event of bankruptcy). Last but 
not in the least, a still further rationale of the inverse relationship stem from the 
arguments of Stulz and Johnson (1985) (with regard to loss of loss of flexibility on the 
part of the company with regard to the use and liquidity of the asset) or Igawa and Kantas 
(1990) (who observed that collateralized borrowing might result in moral hazard 
involving the borrower’s use of pledged assets, in so far as maintaining its value is 
concerned).  
Another important result of this research is the inverse relationship between secured debt 
ratio and firm size; our evidence suggests that the incidence of secured debt declines with 
increase in firm size. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argument that larger firms tended to be 
more diversified and hence failed less often, may not be entirely tenable in this context 
given the statistically insignificant relationship between risk and secured debt ratio. An 
alternative explanation may be based on growth stage of these large sized firms and 
internal resource generating capacity vis-à-vis financing requirement in general and the 
relative unattractiveness of debt financing in particular (the presence of large depreciation 
tax shields might impair the attractiveness of interest tax shield).  Further to this, Sullivan 
(1978) observed that a powerful firm, (i.e., a large firm and/or a firm in a concentrated 
industry), seemed to be confronted by lower costs to attract capital than a non-powerful 
firm, i.e., a smaller firm and/or a firm in an un-concentrated industry. And to the extent 
size and public visibility are directly related (and hence information asymmetry reduced), 
the problem of undervaluation associated with equity financing may be eased and the 
signaling capacity of secured debt may not be of much useful value.  
Findings with regard to the variable, risk, suggests that the use of secured debt decreases 
with volatility of earnings before interest, depreciation and taxes; the results however are 
not statistically significant. Consequently we are unable to validate (or otherwise) the 
findings of Bester (1985), and Chan and Kantas (1985) on the relationship between risk 
and secured debt use in the Indian context. With regard to age, our findings are mixed 
(inverse in case of Model 1 and direct in case of model 2) and statistically insignificant 
(in both cases). Consequently, we conclude that the impact of age on the use of secured 
and unsecured debt is at best ambiguous.  
Conclusion 
This paper tests empirically the role of secured debt in secured debt in addressing agency 
issues and problems of asymmetric information using a sample of listed manufacturing 
firms from the BSE 500 and S&P CNX 500 index. While we find some evidence for the 
former (tangibility and the use of secured debt are directly related), the role of secured 
debt in case of the later does not stand in line with the literature cited above. Specifically, 
the inverse relationship between firm growth opportunities and secured borrowing, as 
observed in this case, may be an outcome of institutional deficiencies pertaining to the 
secured debt market. Our findings concerning firm size and its inverse relationship with 
secured debt ratio also calls for further research on the linkages (if any) between 
financing choice and firm size. This research could not reach any definite conclusion on 
the impact of risk and firm age on secured borrowing.  
The paper suffers from certain limitations. First, the size of the sample used is small 
compared to the universe of listed manufacturing firms in Indian stock markets, keeping 
in mind issues on data availability. Similar considerations have also shortened the period 
of analysis to only 5 years. Second, this paper does not consider the components of 
secured debt that firms of different size, product category and market structure engage in 
optimizing their capital cost. Bringing these issues into consideration is one possible 
agenda for future research on Indian corporate indebtedness. 
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Appendix 1 
Dependent Variable: 
• Secured Debt Ratio: 
AssetsTotal
DebtSecured
 
Where secured debt includes secured bank borrowings, secured financial institutional 
borrowings, secured borrowings syndicated across banks & institutions, hire purchase 
loans, secured deferred credit, secured domestic supplier's credit, debentures/ bonds, non-
convertible debentures/ bonds, zero interest bonds, convertible debentures, optionally 
convertible debentures/bonds, convertible warrants, convertible warrants - of which 
redeemable in the current year, secured foreign currency borrowings, secured foreign 
suppliers’ credit, loans from promoters /directors/shareholders (individuals), secured 
inter-corporate loans, secured loans from subsidiary companies, loans from group/assoc. 
business enterprises, secured loans from other business enterprises 
 
Independent Variable:  
 
• Tangibility:  )(
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• Growth Prospects: 
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• Firm Size: )ln(Sales  
 
• Firm Age: ln( ionIncorporatSinceYearsofNumber ) 
 
 
 
 
